Problematic Probability (Refutation of Determinism Part 2)

A common misconception about atomic theory permits an argument for determinism, suggesting we live in an immovable constrained reality which cannot operate beyond predefined laws that govern its parts. To support paradigmatic determinism, some philosophers have argued that because reality is made up of atomic particles, the nature of that reality cannot transcend the physical restrictions and limitations of those particles. In laymen terms, if atoms indeed are the building blocks of everything, how can anything go against the nature of its parts? This argument is problematic both in its assumption that atoms are fundamental particles and that they only function in a specific pre-described manner. A more nuanced and sophisticated view of fundamental particles, without going too deeply into scientific lexicon and theory, suggests that atoms are not the fundamental particles of all matter. There exist sub-atomic particles, (electrons, protons, and neutrons to name a few) which, as described in a theory of quantum mechanics, do not function in a simply ‘predetermined’ fashion (Marvin 2003).

Though many claims made by quantum mechanics are largely controversial within the scientific community, the basic assumption that we can understand both a particle’s location and direction has been discredited by Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (Ward 2008). The least controversial and perhaps most important claim we can make about sub-atomic particles (electrons in particular) is that their movement and direction does not exist as a matter of certainty (as the determinist world necessitates), but more as a matter of probability. Scientists are able to isolate these particles as existing in spheres of possibility; ostensibly meaning that fundamental particles, if they exist at all, cannot be pinned down with a predetermined location, but rather with a mathematical expectation based on possible locations. Simply put, our best understanding of the fundamental particles that create our existence probably operate in predictable ways, though we can never be certain of their location.

Probability, in a world of determinism, is irrational. If indeed causes necessitate the same effects given the same conditions, there cannot be an alternative. Probability always suggests an alternative, regardless of how astronomical the less likely odds might be. If we best understand fundamental particles existing in a type of probability-driven world, we are always left with the possibility that ‘it could have happened differently given the same conditions’. Determinism does not allow for probable occurrences; rather, it relies upon definite ones. And if there is no definite nature to the particles which create the world, how then could there be a definite nature to the things they create?

Additionally, if we extrapolate our understanding of probability beyond the controversial claims in the world of micro-science, we see the same problem posed by determinism on a lager scale. In the world of man, there is no hard certainty about the actions of people; rather social scientists and mathematicians use methods of probability testing to determine what an individual’s most likely course of action may be in a particular situation. Even if advanced mathematicians can predict human behavior, given societal and personal constraints with 99.999% accuracy, there would still exist a .001% degree of uncertainty. The minuscule possibility may be true only once out of a billion trials, yet it is always possible given the same conditions under which we expect the more probable outcome. Even with such a large margin of certainty, no question, from the nature fundamental particles existing in probability clusters to the nature of human choice factoring in all relevant conditions, can be answered with 100% certainty. And this mere possibility, implicit to any system that relies on probability, grants us the necessary evidence to diffuse and refute a determinist world that requires 100% certainty 100% of the time.

(Afterthought: I realize that one could claim that we are just not privy to the natural laws of the universe which are 100% certain. But it is a much harder claim to posit that math and probability, as we understand it now, have no corollary value to the operation and function of reality. It’s true we might still be in the dark, but the wager you make when you suggest that is to negate many of the applications of math and physics.)