SITE FINALLY MOVED

Ditched the wordpress host a bought my own domain name. It's about time. Update bookmarks to:

http://charactervertigo.com


(http://charactervertigo.net)

This site will not longer be updates. This blog has officially moved beyond its infancy. I'm accepting contributions now; if you like the feel of the blog and would like to contribute, email me.
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Site Moved

Site move: switching to wordpress, check it out http://charactervertigo.wordpress.com/
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Finally, a practical post

4 ideas for the hell-of-it.

Rather than spending my recent graduation days looking for the proverbial real job, I thought I might amuse myself with a few entrepreneurial ideas of my own. If you have the vision and action to make it sparkle, well then here’s to some friendly business brainstorming!

1. HireMyKid.com: In an economy where college grads find themselves bleeding green and returning back to the parental tit, I think there a significantly large enough population of professional parents who have kids without jobs. If one network those people together, through a niche-type of resume/employer site, you could probably hook up overbearing parents across the nation who are willing to do some research to help find there kids work. The catch: you can only be a member of the site if you post at least on opening at your co-operation. Therefore, for every 20+ who needs a job on the site, there is at least one 40+ who looking to (or willing to) hire.

2. GradeMyPaper.com: I was always surprised at how successful sparknotes was at permeating the grade-school student community. How about a site that instead of facilitating cheating or paper swapping, had members send in their papers to be proofread, graded, and critiqued for clarity. This way, you could get the endorsement of schools and perhaps even create a few better writers in the process. I’m not sure if charging for membership or advertising would produce a better profit margin, but surely there a plenty of smart college grads available willing to work cheaply.

3. An online market research group for musicians: Since the dawn of protocols and personal recording technology, it’s become clear that musicians no longer need record companies to produce their music. With the internet and file sharing, they also don’t need larger corporations for access distribution networks. But with the advent of social media networks, promoting your music on the internet can be a bit confusing, especially if you’re a musician and not a tech-junkie. How about a firm of musically-conscious tech nerds who would be responsible for ePromoting, website appeal, and spreading the buzz about a group. And the best part: they would be in no way affiliated with WB, Sony, Arista, etc…

4. An application for the iPhone that is apple to speak with GPS’s and can let the user know when a parking space becomes available in his particular vicinity. This is an application that I wished I’d had for year, and it just hasn’t been doesn’t yet. It could also be a plug-in paid service for Garmin or other GPS companies.

Happy getting rich (or not).

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On Waiting For Godot

An essay I wrote on Waiting for Godot. It is truly a wonderful play. I hope this may shed some light on Beckett's philosophical voice in writing this absurd "tragicomedy".

To understand Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is to plunge deep into a philosopher’s abyss. We are forced to directly confront an existentialist world wholly indifferent to our presence. Waiting for Godot is a play laden with weighty philosophical moments to this conclusion. Using the tramps as his vehicle, Beckett brazens out the mortality of man, which falls perpetually deeper into maddening silence. Beckett’s vision is corroborated by one over-arching truth, which is the first premise for his conception of life: the totality of the world is based on chance and therefore all occurrences are arbitrary. Hence, for Beckett, any meaning we find is subjective – a merely futile attempt to distract us from our miserable predicament. God, if he exists, only furthers our torment through his constant silence. Nevertheless, we persistently wait for a more optimistic truth, but as Godot never comes, neither will our salvation.

To fully construct Beckett’s nihilistic philosophy, we may turn to nearly any moment in the play. In Act I, Vladimir vehemently explains that all things, namely the Gospels, are based on a “reasonable percentage,” a clear allusion to Pascal’s project of idealizing a universe based on chance. In Act II, the tramps fall prey to a classic case of existential paralysis , as they plunge to the ground with Pozzo, all of them rendered involuntarily immobile. In Act I, Lucky’s monologue reduces all of our attempts to find solace in an apathetic world into a single sentence: we waste our time longing for salvation under a heaven indifferent to us, as the looming certainty of death constantly approaches. For this analysis, however, I have chosen the Vladimir’s speech in Act II which is a direct response to Pozzo’s earlier speech about time being the gatekeeper of man’s metaphysical prison. In archetypal postmodernist fashion, Vladimir becomes directly aware of his reality as a character in a cruel world. I believe that in this poetic meta-theatrical moment, Beckett’s philosophical voice comes through the strongest.

<--- Begin Passage for Analysis --->
VLADIMIR:
Was I sleeping, while the others suffered? Am I sleeping now? Tomorrow, when I wake, or think I do, what shall I say of today? That with Estragon my friend, at this place, until the fall of night, I waited for Godot? That Pozzo passed, with his carrier, and that he spoke to us? Probably. But in all that what truth will there be?
(Estragon, having struggled with his boots in vain, is dozing off again. Vladimir looks at him.)
He'll know nothing. He'll tell me about the blows he received and I'll give him a carrot.
(Pause.)
Astride of a grave and a difficult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave digger puts on the forceps. We have time to grow old. The air is full of our cries.
(He listens.)
But habit is a great deadener.
(He looks again at Estragon.)
At me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, He is sleeping, he knows nothing, let him sleep on.
(Pause.)
I can't go on!
(Pause.)
What have I said?
He goes feverishly to and fro, halts finally at extreme left, broods. Enter Boy right. He halts. Silence.
<--- End Passage --->

In the beginning of Vladimir’s speech he entertains a type of Cartesian doubt: “Was I sleeping, while the others suffered? Am I sleeping now?” In doubting the very fundamental constructs of one’s reality – Descartes contends in the cogito – we are able to prove the existence of the self . But Beckett takes this conclusion and turns it on its head; instead of using doubt to prove the self, Vladimir uses it to negate the self, realizing that even if he exists, his existence must certainly be arbitrary. If his situation is, therefore, the random manifestation of chance, then he is irrevocably doomed to repeat the same essential cycle of thoughts and actions indefinitely: “But in all that what truth will there be?” Of course this is a rhetorical question that Beckett asks us directly, but the implied answer is nothing. Even in the face of a well-established Cartesian certainty, Beckett, through Vladimir, turns his back on the self.

In his speech, Vladimir also goes through a series of circular realizations, which are an instrumental premise in Beckett’s vision of the world. After a moment of reflection, Vladimir actually realizes that he is a character in a vicious existence that he cannot escape. I believe that this predicament is directly analogous to Beckett’s convictions about his own life; he too is a character, as we all are, in a never-ending, bleak story that we call ‘living’. Vladimir declares: “Tomorrow, when I wake, or think I do, what shall I say of today? That with Estragon my friend, at this place, until the fall of night, I waited for Godot? That Pozzo passed, with his carrier, and that he spoke to us? Probably.” For Beckett, life is a constant circularity of fortuitous, arbitrary events that only seem important to us because we think they are. These events, Beckett further contends, are distractions that keep us alive, but also keep us miserable. Habits, thus, are not positive notions; in fact, “habit is a great deadener.” The only way to escape the abject cycle is to cease living all together. Perhaps this is why Estragon and Vladimir constantly contemplate suicide, always resolving to bring a bit of rope to their next session of waiting.

Vladimir’s speech also gives the audience a glance into Beckett’s existential views on other people. If we accept my thesis, taking Vladimir to posses Beckett’s philosophical voice in this scene, Estragon, then, is surely everybody else. Estragon’s character is a ubiquitous archetype, which is juxtaposed as the perfect foil to Vladimir – a character driven by more elevated sensibilities. Gogo struggles constantly with his boot, a symbol of the mundane and earthly efforts of man. He also falls asleep at perhaps the most philosophically important part of his partner’s dialogue, “Estragon, having struggled with his boots in vain, is dozing off again.” But Vladimir does not blame Estragon for his shortsightedness, faulty memory, or childish impatience; perhaps then Beckett does not overtly scorn humanity for its constant focus on meaningless details and emotions. And yet, Vladimir does recognize his partner’s shortcomings, declaring: “[tomorrow] … He'll know nothing. He'll tell me about the blows he received and I'll give him a carrot.” If we push this statement further, conscious of Beckett’s first philosophical premise, we can find two of Beckett’s major philosophical views packed deeply in these statements; one is ontological , the other is moral .

Firstly, these statements are the key to Vladimir’s reasoning that he is in a hopeless world that is constantly re-iterating the same events. If the events seem to repeat themselves, and Vladimir is the only one who can recognize it, he is doomed to a lonely consciousness. The great ‘lie’, then, is the belief that the universe is somehow structured or intentional, an ontological thesis sometimes known as nihilism. In another sense, these two sentences characterize Estragon, a symbol for the unenlightened, simple man, as an archetype of man’s complacence. We live constantly unsatisfied but we don’t know why; this is Estragon’s tragedy as he is fated to forget all he has learned. The two tramps live the same day over and over again. But Estragon “know[s] nothing” and therefore each day he is blissfully ignorant of the last. This moral thesis might be called utilitarianism.

Traditional readings of Waiting for Godot peg Vladimir as the optimist and Estragon as the pessimist, but the abovementioned statement (“He’ll know … carrot”) makes me disagree with the critics. Estragon’s ignorance lends him a type of naïvety that Vladimir, whose memory remains somewhat consistent, cannot possibly entertain. Therefore, it appears to me that Vladimir is the pessimist, realizing the true nature of his nihilistic situation, as “the air is full of our cries.” Estragon’s blissful ignorance and simple mind protect him from his Dasein , though it does preserve his confusing reality. Perhaps here Beckett is suggesting that the habits we posses to distract ourselves from the overwhelmingly difficult certainty of our eventual death in some way instantiate the constructs of the system that enslaves us. In other words, in waiting for Godot, we merely wait for our death. If we were able to not wait, perhaps we would never die. But the play re-enforces this notion over and over again, almost as if it were an axiom of their reality: the tramps can’t leave, they must wait, and so ‘they do not move’.

The strongest philosophical sentiments in Vladimir’s speech are expressed, appropriately, near its end. Once he has deconstructed his own world, he seems to realize that he is a character in a story. In a wonderfully cogent postmodernist move, Beckett makes the character aware of his own reality, which again analogously communicates Beckett’s awareness of his own reality. It is almost as if Beckett himself is onstage muttering the words when Vladimir says: “(He looks again at Estragon.) At me too someone is looking, of me too someone is saying, He is sleeping, he knows nothing, let him sleep on. (Pause.) I can't go on!” And indeed Vladimir is correct, for the audience is one such onlooker who judges Vladimir and Estragon as absurd, ridiculous characters. But the suggestion of this line goes far deeper, especially if we attribute it to Beckett himself.

“At me too someone is looking,” is perhaps a direct reference to Sartre’s gaze of the other , a first-wave existentialist theory which essentially contends that complicated ideas and problems of ‘self’ are conjured in an individual when he realizes that he is being looked at by another. This, in turn, fundamental alters the way that one views himself. Sartre thinks that when we look at others, we try to objectify them, removing them as subjects of their own experience and making them objects of our own experience. Yet when the other gazes at us, and we become aware of this (as Vladimir certainly has here), Sartre says we that acknowledge the negation of ourselves as a subject, whereby a certain type of leveling occurs within the self. To fully apprehend this, Sartre claims, is to intimately recognize a deep void – represented by nothingness – implicit in one’s self. Though we needn’t get so technical to understand the meaning of Vladimir’s line, the gaze that an indifferent God (or audience) imposes upon him, forces one either into a type of ignorant but unsatisfying sleep – which Estragon demonstrates perfectly – or an apprehension of man’s futility. The latter path is exactly what Vladimir is approaching when he desperate declares: “I can’t go on!” And if we take this to be an accurate reading of the text, the “pauses” in the stage directions allow Vladimir ample time to reason through this process. The result horrifies him so, that he pauses again, reflects, and declares: “What have I said?” It is, again, as if Beckett himself is unable to cope with the conclusion that he has drawn from the structural implications of the other’s dominating gaze.

At the end of this excerpt, Vladimir “goes feverishly to and fro” as if he is wavering between the choice to forget what he has discovered and sleep (like Estragon), or to apprehend the truth, and simply tarry until the end. It seems, when “he halts finally at extreme left, broods” that he has made his decision, but it is unclear that this is so. The boy’s arrival interrupts this process, and the silence that comes after is perhaps a cue that the whole cycle – of Vladimir’s rejection of the self, criticisms of humanity, and his eventual apprehension of nothingness – is bound to repeat once more. This time, however, it is in the context of conversation with the boy: the boy resumes Estragon’s role while Beckett continues to speak through Vladimir. Therefore the “silence” that ends the excerpt is perhaps louder than Vladimir’s speech altogether. It is in that silence which we are forced to reflect upon the truth which is so hard to confront. And this truth, of an arbitrary existence, is so hopeless that it forces us to constantly forget it, delaying the last moment as many times as possible, until we waste away into nothingness.

Wittgenstein famously declared, at the end of his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, “Of that which we cannot speak, we must remain silent .” For Beckett, man’s confrontation of his mortality and finitude forces him to suffer in anguish for his entire life. Vladimir, repeating Pozzo, explains this explicitly: “[we exist] astride of a grave and a difficult birth.” The tragedy is that we are doomed to reflect about it in silence. Yet Waiting for Godot is Beckett’s attempt to disprove Wittgenstein; this absurdist tragicomedy is Beckett’s best attempt at capturing the miserable implications of a world that is indifferent to a creature which clings so insistently to it. Vladimir’s speech, therefore, is simultaneously an acknowledgment of a metaphysical truth about the world, the rejection of hope in man, and intimate commentary on man’s relationship with himself and others. To some, Beckett’s voice here is absurd, but, for me, it couldn’t be any clearer.

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Russell want his cake.. we'll not stand for it!

In chapter 5 of the Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy, Russell draws a strict dichotomy between two different systems of knowledge acquisition; the first of these espitemes is called “knowledge through acquaintance” – which includes facts that we become empirically aware of via our observational sense-data and its effect on our beliefs. The second such espiteme is “knowledge through description” – the more elusive sensibility responsible for classifying and categorizing a series of truths through “universals that our sense may not have direct access to”. To illustrate the formal difference between the two systems, Russell uses a rudimentary example of the table he is writing on. Therefore, when we observe a table’s properties (size, shape, and/or color), our conclusions about said properties are known through our acquaintance to it (the object). Contrarily, we know the table to be as such (a table) through description, our understand of certain truths which classify ‘such-and-such object x’ as ‘table’.

Russell further claims that we come to know abstract ideas, what he calls “universals,” through the latter, descriptive type of mental cognition. Yet, earlier in the chapter, he extends the process of knowledge by acquaintance to include various types of awareness. In his example of ‘staring into the sun’, Russell argues that one becomes aware of the sun’s presence through acquaintance. In addition, he also becomes aware of his own awareness [of the sun] through acquaintance. For Russell, the self is known through acquaintance even though it is an abstract concept – this is where I disagree.

The problem I would like to pose for Russell’s epistemology, insofar that he offers one, is that it seems that the mental faculty of self-awareness and the mental capacity to conceive of abstractions are not so ontologically different than Russell argues them to be. Isn’t our awareness of our own consciousness, even in the sun case, the same type of abstraction that is required to contextualize such ‘universals’ as justice, wisdom, theory, etc? Russell would argue that we only probably know our ‘self’ through our acquaintance with it; this is fine, but how is this fundamentally different than the way we come to understand concepts like justice, aesthetics, piety, and so on? Are we not also acquainted with the latter virtues through our cognitive experience just as we are acquainted with color, size, and shape through our senses?

Ostensibly, Russell attempts to create a taxonomy of knowledge that is unsuccessful, not in its novelty, but in its disparate attempts to grant agency to two cognitive functions in contrast. Thus either 1) our epistemology is strict, ordered (like Russell’s says), though Russell is mistaken that our cognitive faculty to think about and conceive of abstractions exists in two different systems or 2) our epistemology is unpredictable, resisting categorization and Russell’s epistemes of acquaintance and description are wrong altogether.

This inconsistency in his epistemological paradigm would not be as much of a problem if Russell relegated knowledge by acquaintance to only describe superficial observation; but he doesn’t leave it there. Russell wants both epistemological systems to be capable of conceiving in abstraction, such that our descriptive tendency can conceptualize and analyze high-order emotions while the acquaintance tendency can describe our self-conscious awareness. Is he trying to have his cake and eat it too? Well I’ll not stand for it… I’m calling him out.

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Four Critiques of Chomsky's Universal Grammar

Chomsky’s Universal Grammar presupposes certain necessary characteristics for a language to posses which, I think, a skeptic could rightfully deny him. If you agree with any of the following criticisms of Chomsky’s so-called “poverty stimulus thesis,” than perhaps it might weaken the grip that universal grammar seems to have imposed, a priori, on our mind. I propose four criticisms below:

For Chomsky’s universal grammar to be accepted as an appropriate explanation of where we get our language from, than the virtues of our ‘language faculty’ become the very characteristics that we need to appropriately define language. What I mean by this is that in order for a language X to qualify as a language, it is not enough proof that it is spoken or written, but that it indeed follows from the ‘language faculty’ in our brains, and therefore abides by the rules of universal grammar. I think this closes the door for many systems of communication that we consider languages to qualify as such under Chomsky’s conception. This criticism, I’ll call the (1) problem of linguistic provinciality.

I would argue that UG supplants a broadly construed definition of language – an organized system of communication with some sort of meaningful consistency and coherence of terms – with a much more provincial one. For Chomsky, modern language is an evolutionary legacy of universal grammar. However, other linguistic communicative systems that have evolved in tandem with our spoken language, like mathematics, music, and computer science, ought also to qualify as language, because we use them as such. But it seems that do not, under Chomsky’s rule, because they are devoid of universal grammar. For in Math, there is no present or past tense, in music there is not subject/verb/object, and in programming, there need not be intentionality, especially if the ‘listener’ has a microprocessor instead of a brain. Are these things not then languages?

I would also point out Chomsky’s failure to consistently describe the language faculty’s location that he claims essential to the generation of universal grammar. This criticism we can call (2) the problem of locality. First he says, “… it is concerned with those aspects form and meaning that are determined by the ‘language faculty’ which is understood to be a particular component of the human mind,” (4) and yet, later in the same paragraph, he claims “UG may therefore be regarded as a characterization of the genetically determined language faculty.” (5) Is universal grammar a product of the mind – and therefore presumably different in each mind that conceives it – or is it a deterministic product of our biology, and therefore consistently hard-wired within every human being. If the former, how can we claim to know anything about it at all beyond what we can analyze of our own minds? If the later, how can we account for the varicolored variety of languages, dialects, and means of expression across cultures and even in homogenous groups? Mere environmental factors? I don’t buy it…

An additional criticism I can offer is what we can refer to as (3) a circular assertion of triviality, which renders Chomsky’s thesis to be much less informative than he claims it is. To me, the language faculty is a murky, elusive property/organ (explained above), which doesn’t offer anything more interesting than the trivial fact: ‘languages are learned by humans through a language acquisition device, where the LAD is innate.’ If true, this is obvious, but since we haven’t found said ‘language faculty’ to be an organelle in the brain, claims of its existence are pseudoscientific. That said, it appears that the language faculty that Chomsky hypothesizes isn’t really a theory of language, but an explanandum in disguise, still looking for a theory to explain it.

My fourth and final criticism, called (4) the denial of future languages, is concerned with the first. Do the unconventional languages abovementioned qualify as languages? If they don’t, and Chomsky is right about the language faculty, wouldn’t all these language-esque constructions (like music, math, and programming), need their own brain faculties and universal structures in order to exist in such complex and endless variety? Is their an ‘art faculty,’ a ‘math faculty’ and so on… Yet, supposing that the aforementioned languages do posses some relationship with Chomsky’s universal grammar, why are they so fundamentally different to normative conception of language? Any rule of UG that we predict can surely be contradicted by some language, or linguistic system that approaches the structure of a language. Ultimately, my opinion is that, while universal grammar is attractive and seductive as an idea, it limits our means to create and instantiate new languages because of an evolutionary burden that Chomsky has rested upon our shoulders. And I’m not sure its even there in the first place.

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Hypocrisy #1: Republicanism.

I don't understand the modern conservative American party in this country. Their moral/political views seem to contradict each other, selectively placing priorities on results that they want. I personally don't think ends justify means (and I suppose the republican ethos needs that), but there is a downright hypocrisy going on here.

Here's what I mean.

<-- premises -->

1. Republicans want a limited central government

1.1 They insist on the sovereignty of states and those states’ rights to police their peoples.

2. Republicans want freedom; they don't want the burden of the federal government invading their privacy and telling that what to do.

2.1 They don't like gun control, they don't support big spending programs, they don't like high taxes, and they want a big military - not to police its people - but to protect these freedoms.

2.2 These values (even if they aren't yours) are consistent; Republicans want freedom and limited government, so, in order to be consistent, they side with positions which protect freedom and limit government.

<-- conclusions/consistency test -->

Let's look at some other sides that are classically republican, and see if it passes our consistency test.

3. Republicans are often pro-life.

3.1 They feel that the protection of an unborn infant infant's life is more important than her mother's wishes.

3.2 They feel that the federal government ought to impede the mother's privacy

3.3.1 They feel that, while the federal government ought not to interfere with our own personal life, the same government ought to be able to make personal decisions for individuals.

3.3.2 In this case the decision whether or not to have an abortion is a perfect example of the government overstepping its bounds. Isn't that a serious Republican concern?

3.3 Pro-life legislation, which republicans also support, would increase the federal government jurisdiction into the wombs of its citizens. Is this limiting its powers?

:.

A pro-life stance is blatantly inconsistent with the value of a limited government. Making abortions illegal would violate the very intrinsic notions of freedom that we raise large militaries, so voraciously, to protect.

Let's also take gay marriage

4. Republicans are frequently against same-sex marriage.

4.1 They feel that marriage is a covenant between two people and God

4.2 They feel that, because traditionally, same-sex couples have never been married, that this practice will somehow spoil the sanctity of this relationship.

4.2.1 What they don't realize is that by legislating against same-sex marriage, you take that "sanctified" "holy" relationship and instead bring in the cold calculated logic of the law.

4.2.2 If marriage is a contract between two individuals and God, certainly the federal government has not say over what is a valid contract and what isn't. Wouldn't that COMPLETELY destroy the very sanctity that you are striving so hard to protect.

4.3 In rejecting the same-sex marriage, they bring the law into their morality. This impedes on the FREEDOM of others by EXTENDING THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. And I thought we were trying to limit this beast here...

:.

A rejection of same-sex marriage is inconsistent with the value of personal freedom and limited federal government. Making same-sex marriage illegal would take a proclaimed "holy union" and turn it into a legal affair. I'm not saying that this hasn't happened already...

These seem to me to be two such examples of republican moral hypocrisy. On TV, pundits claim to be pro-life and yet pro-freedom, they are anti-gay-marriage while anti-federal government. These positions seem to me, on a purely basic level, to be completely inconsistent.

Next week we'll take a stab at the democrats.

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fine day to work off some excess energy; steal something heavy

Everyone is necessarily the hero of his own life story.
-Jon Barth

I know that … the charm of fables awakens the mind; that the memorable deeds recounted in histories uplifted, and, if read with discretion, aid informing one's judgment; that the reading of all good books is like a conversation with the most honorable people of past ages, who were their authors, indeed, even like a set conversation in which they reveal to us only the best of their thoughts.
-Renee Descartes





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The "ultimate" articulation of a nihilist's ethics in a floating opera

Here's a rather seductive argument that I just read in Barth's The Floating Opera, a wonderfully nihilistic novel about Todd Andrews intellectual descent into the wrath of his own mind.

I recommend it as a read if you're into cynicism. Anyway, his logic, in the final chapters, is certainly noteworthy:

<-- begin -->

I. Nothing has intrinsic value

II. The reasons for which people attribute value to things are always ultimately irrational

III. There is, therefore, no ultimate "reason" for valuing anything (including life).

IV. Living is an action.

V. There's no final reason for action (just as there is no final reading for valuing anything).

VI. There's no final reason for living.

<-- abyss -->

Questions raised:

1. Is 'value' a valuable concept?

1.1 Do we need 'value' to have will? In other words, does Andrew's rhetoric destroy our will to power? Our will to anything?

2. What are intrinsic qualities of anything? Mustn't intrinsic qualities be ascribed by the very people who claimed those qualities to be intrinsic?

3. What is an "ultimate reason" at all if there are no "intrinsic qualities"?

3.1 Ultimate reasons are indeed meaningless if there is nothing to be ultimate about them (this isn't a question I realize)

4. Can reasons for actions be relative instead of ultimate?

5. If there's no reason for living, is that necessarily a good reason for not-living?


The first to refute this argument, on logical or rational grounds, gets a present.


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To the LaRouche Campaign: You are Idiots Who do not offer anything of substance

I don't know if you've ever run into the LaRouche political activist campaign, but they are convinced that Obama is the new Hitler. I wrote them a letter today which outlines the basic problems with the only argument I could find on a website that claims to have "infallible evidence that Obama is a modern day Hitler."


The topic is Obama's health care policy, but this is really just an effort to dispell sophistry by calling it out whenever you see it.
_______________________________________
To whom it may concern @ the Larouche Activist Committee:

I respect free speech and would like to engage someone in a meaningful dialogue.

I’ve seen you guys in the streets and read a bit through your material. I’ve also perused your website, and I must say, for the amount of content that you guys have generated, I’m finding very little substance.

I get that you don’t like Obama; I understand that you think his proposed solutions to the healthcare crisis in our country (and you are deluding yourself if you do not think we are currently in a state of crisis with over 40 million people completely uninsured), but I think your comparison of Obama to Hitler is anachronistic, incorrect, and misleading.

Here’s why:

I only found one real argument on your website; the rest is empty rhetoric. You claim that Obama's proposed "universal healthcare" solution is analogous to Hitler’s ‘T-4’ proposal whereby a panel of doctors selected by the executive office will decide who will be covered until a universal healthcare plan and those who will not be covered (or condemned to die as you put it).

Does this mean that every political figure who has proposed a universal healthcare policy - with doctors informing his or decisions - is also like Hitler?

Here’s a brief list of countries who instituted universal healthcare policies for its citizens, which were instantiated by a list of government chosen doctors:
• Brazil
• Canada
• Colombia
• Mexico
• India
• Israel
• Taiwan
• Thailand
• Finland
• Germany
• England
• Netherlands

Shall we accuse all of these county’s leaders of Hitlerian economics? I think Israel might take offense.

Ostensibly, what this says to me is that your argument, the only somewhat-rationally based one I could find on your website, is based in a false analogy. And if your premises are false – as the analogy is no good – than the conclusion, that we should “call for the impeachment of Obama based on his embracement of a Nazi policy” is also false.

I am not an economic scholar, but a simple understanding of the logic reveals inaccuracy and misrepresentation in your logos. It is almost as if you are saying Hitler was the leader of a powerful country and Obama is the leader of a powerful country :. Hitler is Obama. It is these type of empty arguments which distract our attention and unnecessarily confuse important issues.

So now that I’ve said that, I have only one question for you, and I would appreciate an answer. Obama’s proposed universal healthcare system would definitely insure people who have no coverage today, but it would not mandate those who have private insurance to switch over.

Perhaps the new public plan will not be as effective, as extensive, as comprehensive, or as efficient as private insurance plans (I'm willing to give you that with 90% certainty), but who is coercing anyone to accept the public plan? For those who have no insurance, it can only help. For those who have insurance that they are happy with, nothing will change. For those who don’t like their current insurance, they now have a new option – that could be better, or could be worse.

So my question is simple:
How can providing the public with yet another option of their OWN choosing ever be a bad thing?

How can you say that people who have no healthcare should continue to have no healthcare when Obama’s proposed system can only benefit those without healthcare whilst not necessarily changing those that have it?

In a democratic-republic, we are entitled to as many options as private and public can offer us. Why is one more bad?

Sincerely,

Aaron Krivitzky

When I get a response from these guys, I'll be sure to post it.

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